Wrist-wearables such as smartwatches and fitness bands are equipped with a variety of high-precision sensors that enable collection of rich contextual information related to the wearer and his/her surroundings and support a variety of novel context-and activity-based applications. The presence of such a diverse set of on-board sensors, however, also expose an additional attack surface which, if not adequately protected, could be potentially exploited to leak private user information. In this paper, we comprehensively investigate the feasibility of a new vulnerability that attempts to take advantage of a wrist-wearable's seemingly innocuous and poorly regulated motion sensors to infer a user's input on mechanical devices typically used to secure physical access, for example, combination locks. In this direction, we outline two motion-based inference frameworks: i) a deterministic attack framework that attempts to infer a lock's unlock combination from the wrist motion (specifically, angular displacement) data obtained from a wrist-wearable's gyroscope sensor, and ii) a probabilistic attack framework that extends the output of the deterministic framework to produce a ranked list of likely unlock combinations. Further, we conduct a thorough empirical evaluation of the proposed frameworks by employing unlocking-related motion data collected from human subject participants in a variety of controlled and realistic settings. Evaluation results from these experiments demonstrate that motion data from wrist-wearables can be effectively employed as an information side-channel to significantly reduce the unlock combination search-space of commonly-found combination locks, thus compromising the physical security provided by these locks.
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Introduction
Wrist-wearables such as smartwatches and fitness bands are gaining tremendous popularity among mobile users, and will continue to be a prevalent mobile technology in the future [3] . These "smart" wearable devices are equipped with a variety of high-precision sensors that can capture extremely rich and fine-grained contextual and physiological information related to the mobile user and his/her surroundings , which in turn, can enable several novel non-traditional applications on, or by means of, these devices.
The presence of a diverse set of sensors on-board these devices, however, also expose an additional attack surface which, if not adequately protected, could be potentially exploited to leak private user information. Weak or absent access control and security policies vis-á-vis some of these sensors have further compounded this problem. The research literature is rife with proposals that demonstrate how data from wrist-wearable sensors (specifically, smartwatch sensors) can be abused to infer private user information, such as, keystrokes, activities and behavior [30] , [46] , [28] , [29] , [45] , [41] , [49] , [48] , [23] . The continuous placement of wrist-wearables on users' body (wrist), coupled with their unique design and usage, also puts them at a significantly higher risk of being targeted for such privacy threats. A majority of these vulnerabilities target the device's zeropermission sensors, i.e., hardware or software sensors that are not regulated by explicit user or system-defined access permissions. Such zero-permission sensors (e.g., accelerometers and gyroscopes) provide a relatively straightforward and unobstructed attack surface to the adversary.
In this research effort, our focus is on threats that enable an adversary to infer private inputs or interactions made by a target user on an input-interface (of some system of interest to the adversary) by taking advantage of unregulated sensor data available from the user's wrist-wearable. A majority of research contributions in this direction have primarily focused on threats that attempt to infer private user inputs on interfaces of purely cyber or cyber-physical systems, for example, inference of keystrokes or taps on physical keyboards or touchscreen-based keypads [30] , [46] , [28] , [29] , [45] , [22] . Outcomes of such threats, if successful, can significantly impact the cyber-security and cyber-presence of targeted users. We focus on a slightly different kind of threat in this paper which is to investigate the feasibility of inferring a target user's private inputs or interactions on the interface of a purely mechanical device by harnessing the sensor data available from the user's wrist-wearable. We specifically focus on inferring inputs on mechanical devices typically used to secure physical access (on doors and lockers), for example, combination locks. Such privacy threats concerning mechanical safety devices, which may now be feasible due to the upcoming wearable device technology, has the potential of impacting the physical safety and security of users. Despite their severity, such threats have not received much attention in the literature.
Our specific research goal in this paper is to investigate the feasibility of inferring unlock combinations of commercially-available mechanical combination locks and safes (as shown in Figure 1 ) by exploiting inertial or motion sensor data from wrist-wearables such as smartwatches. To unlock such combination locks, an authorized user typically enters the secret unlocking combination or key as a sequence of counter-clockwise and clockwise rotations of the lock's circular numeric dial. Now during the unlocking process, the wrist on the unlocking hand undergoes perceptible and unique movements and rotations of its own, which is strongly correlated with the unlock combination. Our hypothesis is that, if these motions can be accurately captured and characterized, say, by targeting the gyroscope sensor on-board the unlocking hand's wrist-wearable, then it can be used to infer the lock's combination. Our objective is to validate the above hypothesis by empirically evaluating the accuracy and effort with which such an inference attack can be executed using modern wrist-wearables. In line with this objective, we make the following technical contributions: 1) A novel motion-based combination or key inference framework comprising of: (i) an activity recognition component for efficiently and accurately identifying unlocking-related data in the continuous motion data stream, (ii) a segmentation component to separate and appropriately characterize motion data corresponding to each part of the multi-part combination or key, and (iii) an attack component that maps the characterizations of the individual parts obtained from the previous steps to a (or a set of) valid combination(s) or key(s). 2) A comprehensive empirical evaluation of the proposed attack framework in order to assess its performance on: (i) a commercially available padlock and safe, (ii) using different key spaces, (iii) in a cross-device setting, (iv) in a cross-hand setting, and (iv) under real-life lock operation scenarios.
Related Work
Threats that attempt to infer private information, usercontexts or user-activities by capturing related electromagnetic, acoustic, optical and/or mechanical emanations from the target device or user and employing them as information side-channels have been well-studied in the literature [38] , [24] , [4] , [6] , [11] , [9] , [7] , [44] , [8] , [19] , [5] , [47] , [26] . With the advent of smartphones, researchers started focusing on employing the phone's on-board hardware and software sensors to investigate the feasibility of similar inference attacks [43] . One notable sensor modality that now became available as an attack vector is the smartphone's inertial or motion sensors such as accelerometers and gyroscopes which could capture fine-grained linear and angular motion of the users or the object on which the phone was placed. Smartphone inertial sensors have been exploited to infer keystrokes on the phone itself as well as external keyboards [10] , [31] , [12] , [50] , [37] , to track user movements and locations [18] , [20] , [35] , to infer private user activities [36] and to decode human speech [32] . Similarly smartphone microphone and/or magnetometer have also been exploited to infer private user information [40] or trade secrets (such as 3D-printer designs) [21] , [42] , [17] , private user activities [39] and natural handwriting [52] power usage over a period of time available from the smartphone's power meter was used to track user movements and locations [33] .
The arrival and tremendous popularity of smartwatches has fueled a similar line of research in the area of private user-input, activity and context inference threats that take advantage of data available from sensors on-board these commercial wrist-wearable devices. However, as smart wearables, unlike smartphones, are always carried by users on their body in the same natural position, data available from them is more vulnerable to misuse and the inference attacks more likely to be successful. Smartwatch motion sensors, similar to the smartphone case, have been exploited to infer keystrokes [30] , [46] , [28] , [29] , [45] , user-activities [41] , [27] , handwriting [49] , [48] and driving behavior [23] . Recently, ambient light sensors on these devices have also been used to infer private keystroke information [22] . Given this plethora of research results, it is clear that sensors on-board mobile and wearable devices pose a significant privacy threat. It is alarming though that common mobile and wearable device users are unaware of such threats [14] .
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the feasibility of a novel kind of threat which could result in an adversary learning the combination of a mechanical lock being unlocked by a target user. This threat, which is primarily possible due to the misuse of inertial or motion sensors on wrist-wearables, shows that upcoming mobile technology has the potential of impacting not only the cyber security and cyber presence, but also the physical safety and security of users. Several modern smart locks offer a numeric keypad which can be compromised using known smartwatch-based keystroke inference techniques in the literature [30] , [46] , [28] , [29] , [45] . However, in this paper we target traditional rotation-based mechanical locks which are still very popular and where existing attack techniques will not work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort that comprehensively studies such a privacy threat.
Adversary Model
We consider the scenario of a target user who is wearing/donning a wrist-wearable such as a smartwatch and is entering the unlocking combination or key on the circular dial of a mechanical combination lock (targeted by the adversary) with the watch-wearing hand. The goal of the adversary is to infer the unlocking combination of the lock by employing the inertial or motion sensor data available from the smartwatch worn by the target user. We assume that the adversary has knowledge of the exact type (make and model) of the target combination lock and that the dial of the lock has sufficient resistance to prevent rotation by mere movement of fingers. The adversary is able to record and obtain the inertial or motion sensor data from the target smartwatch through several different modalities. One way an adversary can achieve this is by creating a malicious eavesdropping app and disguising it as a useful app or by hiding some malicious eavesdropping code within the code of a useful app. In other words, the adversary creates a trojan app and then tricks the unsuspecting target user or victim into downloading and installing this trojan onto their wearable device. In case the adversary is a popular service provider, gaining access in such a fashion is much more straightforward as unsuspecting users may download and install the malicious app on their own volition. This malicious eavesdropping app samples the on-device sensors of interest (specifically, the gyroscope sensor data is used for this particular attack) and transfers the sampled sensor data to a remote server controlled by the adversary through some covert communication channel, say by hiding it within useful communications. We assume that the malicious app has the required permissions to access these sensors of interest. The malicious app can accomplish this by tricking the victim into giving the app explicit permissions to access those sensors or by targeting zero-permission sensors. As the proposed attack employs the gyroscope sensor, which is a zero-permission sensor on popular wearable operating systems such as Android Wear and watchOS, the adversary has a relatively unobstructed attack path once the malicious app is installed on the device. We also assume that the adversary maintains a remote control server with sufficient storage and computational resources to archive the eavesdropped data and to perform offline inference computations. The adversary model presented so far is practical and a standard assumption for this line of investigation. In addition to the above cyber resources, the adversary also has a limited amount of physical access to the targeted lock (in order to conduct the actual physical attack on the lock by trying out the inferred combination), but not long enough to manually brute-force the lock's combination. In our attack setup, we also assume that the adversary uses this physical access to preset the (lock's) dial to a fixed/known position, before the target user starts entering the combination key.
Background
In this section, we first outline the internal mechanical structure and physical operation associated with two different types of combination locks considered in this work. Then by means of empirical observations, we study the relationship between wrist movements sensed by a smart-watch on the unlocking hand and the unlock combination entered by the user. We also outline technical details of the pre-processing required to translate this wrist motion data into angular displacements which will be used within our inference frameworks described in Sections 5 and 6.
Mechanical Combination Padlocks and Safes
After studying the technical specifications of several commercially available mechanical combination locks, we decided to focus on two specific types of locks whose internal mechanical structure and physical operation are representative and/or commonly found in most combination locks: (i) padlocks, and (ii) consumer-grade safes. For the padlock we chose a Master Lock 1500T model lock ( Figure  1a ), while for the safe we chose a First Alert 2087F-BD safe (Figure 1b ).
The internal structure of a Master Lock 1500T padlock, which has a 3-number combination key, comprises of three stacked metal cams, with the topmost cam bonded directly to the turning dial of the lock (Figure 1a ). Each of the cams have one tooth on both sides, and these teeth engage as the cams rotate. The purpose of these cams is to control a latch that engages the end of the lock's hasp. Also, each of these cams have an indentation in them. When the indentations align correctly, the latch is able to fit into the indentations and release the hasp; otherwise the latch keeps the hasp engaged. The front dial of the Master Lock 1500T is used to enter the unlock combination key and has 40 numbers on its face. As the combination key comprises of three numbers (each taking a value between 0 and 39) which must be entered sequentially, the resulting theoretical combination key space is 40 3 = 64, 000. In order to unlock the Master Lock 1500T, a user must turn the dial clockwise two full rotations and stop at the first number of the combination key on the third turn (phase 1), then turn it counter-clockwise past the first number of the combination key to the second number of the key (phase 2), and finally turn the dial clockwise to the third number of the combination key (phase 3). Let traversing from one number to it's sequential number (in any direction) be called a "unit" of traversal. Then it should be noted that, depending on the combination key being entered, in phase 1 the user traverses anywhere between 81 and 120 units in the clockwise direction, in phase 2 he traverses anywhere between 41 and 80 units in the counter-clockwise direction, and in phase 3 he traverses anywhere between 1 and 40 units in the clockwise direction. If this procedure (which depends on the lock's internal structure as described above and generally fixed by the manufacturer) is correctly followed, and if the entered combination key is correct, the indentations on the lock's cams align correctly allowing the hasp to be released and opening the lock.
Combination locks on consumer-grade safes also have a very similar internal structure, but may have higher number of cams (and thus, longer combination keys) for more security. The First Alert 2087F-BD safe's lock dial comprises of 100 numbers (from 0 to 99) on its face. It's combination key comprises of four numbers (each taking a value between 0 and 99) which must be entered sequentially, thus resulting in a theoretical combination key space of 100 4 . In order to unlock the safe, a user must turn the dial counterclockwise four full rotations and stop at the first number of the combination key on the fifth turn (phase 1), then turn it clockwise twice past the first number to the second number (phase 2), then turn it counter-clockwise past the second number to stop at the third number (phase 3), and finally turn the dial clockwise to the fourth number (phase 4). Depending on the combination key being entered, in phase 1 the user traverses anywhere between 401 and 500 units in the counter-clockwise direction, in phase 2 he traverses anywhere between 201 and 300 units in the clockwise direction, in phase 3 he traverses anywhere between 101 and 200 units in the counter-clockwise direction, and in phase 4 he traverses anywhere between 1 and 100 units in the clockwise direction. Similar to the the Master Lock 1500T, if this procedure is correctly followed and if the entered combination key is correct, the safe opens.
Relationship between Combination Key Entered by User and Wrist Movements
Now before designing an inference framework, we need to study and gain a clear understanding of how the activity of entering a combination key on a lock's dial impacts the wrist movement of the unlocking hand, and if it is possible to accurately and consistently characterize this movement using the motion sensor data obtained from state-of-the-art wrist wearables such as smartwatches. More concretely, we would like to first understand the relationship between the amount of movement of a lock's dial and the corresponding amount movement of the user's wrist. We quantify the amount of movement of a lock's dial using the parameter transition, which measures the number of units traversed when inputing a particular number of the combination. As the unlock combination key of the Master Lock 1500T padlock has three numbers (and correspondingly, the unlocking procedure has three phases), the amount of movement of the lock's dial during the unlocking process can be completely characterized by three transitions. Similarly, as the unlock combination of a First Alert 2087F-BD safe has four numbers, the amount of movement of the lock's dial during the unlocking process can be completely characterized by four transitions. We quantify the amount movement (or rotation) of a user's wrist by computing the angular displacement from the observed smartwatch gyroscope data. As the smartwatch gyroscope measures angular velocity, the corresponding angular displacements can be easily calculated by integrating the obtained angular velocity readings.
In order to quantify the relationship between transitions on a lock's dial and the wrist's angular displacements, we conduct some preliminary unlocking experiments on the Master Lock 1500T padlock. Specifically, we collected smartwatch gyroscope samples at a sampling rate of 200 Hz from three human subjects who unlocked the padlock wearing a Samsung Gear Live. The subjects in our preliminary experiments entered 40 different combinations on the Master Lock 1500T padlock which covered all the 120 possible transitions (40 possible transitions per number in any combination key). While entering each combination, the subjects always started from a fixed position (number 0) and entered the combination by correctly following the unlocking procedure described in Section 4.1. For each subject, we plot (see Figures 2 (a), (b) and (c)) the angular displacement (in radians), calculated by integrating the corresponding angular velocities observed on the x-axis of the smartwatch's gyroscope, for each each transition in either direction. From these plots, we can make the following significant observations. First we observe that, for each transition (irrespective of the direction of rotation), the angular displacement of the wrist calculated from the raw smartwatch gyroscope data is not the same as the angular displacement of the lock's dial. These inaccuracies could be attributed to the discrete nature of the gyroscope readings, which is dictated by the maximum sampling rate of the gyroscope hardware. In addition to this, the cartilaginous joints between the fingers and the wrist, do not allow for a perfect rotation of the wrist during the unlocking operation. The result of this observation is that an adversary cannot simply use the angular displacement of the wrist calculated from the raw smartwatch gyroscope data to determine the angular displacement on the lock's dial and thus the corresponding transition. Our second observation is that the angular displacement of the wrist calculated from the raw smartwatch gyroscope data is an approximately increasing linear function of the transitions on the lock's dial. Although intuitive, the interesting and encouraging aspect here is that this relationship is consistently captured (for all subjects) by the current gyroscope hardware. Lastly, we observe that this linear relationship is reasonably homologous or similar across different subjects. An important point to note is that we only used the x-axis of the gyroscope data for these plots, because we observed that the x-axis remains perpendicular to the lock (Figure 1a ) during the unlocking operation and provides a more accurate measure of angular displacement than the other two axes.
So, what do these results mean from the perspective of an adversary who wants to infer the combination key entered by some target user? If the adversary uses the setup described in Section 3 to obtain the smartwatch gyroscope data from the target user and computes the angular displacements of the user's wrist at each step (phase) of the unlocking procedure, he will be unable to accurately determine the corresponding angular displacements of the lock's dial or transitions (and thus the corresponding numbers in the combination) from the computed angular displacement of the wrist. An adversary could, however, use the above observations to formulate a learning-based inference framework that translates angular displacements of the wrist (computed from the smartwatch's gyroscope data) to transitions on the lock's dial, and train this framework using some available training data. The adversary could then employ such a trained inference framework to infer the combination entered by the target user from the smartwatch gyroscope data. We develop such an inference framework in Sections 5 and 6. Before designing such an inference framework, there are two other important issues that need to be addressed. First, in a long sequence of gyroscope time-series data, how does the adversary identify the gyroscope data corresponding to the unlocking motion? Second, to accurately compute the angular displacement of the wrist for each phase of the unlocking procedure, the adversary needs to divide or segment the gyroscope time-series into individual phases. We address both these issues next.
Unlocking Activity Recognition
Before attempting to infer combinations from the target user's wrist motions, one critical challenge for the adversary is to precisely detect when the unlock event takes place. As it may not always be feasible for an adversary to manually monitor the target user, we designed an activity recognition system to detect and record timestamps of unlocking operations on combination locks. Our activity recognition system does not require any additional adversarial capabilities or resources as it employs only the gyroscope data stream (specifically, the x-axis data) which is already recorded by the adversary for the inference tasks. The detection of unlocking operations or activities is nontrivial due to several reasons [25] : (a) the amount of rotation on a lock's dial varies significantly with the combination key, (b) the speed and other wrist motion characteristics during unlocking varies from person to person, and (c) the entire unlocking activity lasts (or spans over) only a few seconds. The key to designing an accurate technique for recognizing unlocking operations is to identify and extract features (from the gyroscope data) that are compatible across different unlocking combinations and persons, yet fine-grained enough to be able to detect the few seconds of unlocking-related activity within a much larger observation window. While analyzing characteristics of the time-series gyroscope data, we observed that the integrated angular displacement increases on both positive and negative axis in successive periods. This is probably because after rotating the dial (clockwise or counter-clockwise) to an extent, users release the dial, go back in reverse (counter-clockwise or clockwise, respectively), again grab the dial, and continue entering the remaining part of the combination key (clockwise or counter-clockwise, respectively). We refer to one such clockwise-counterclockwise (or vice-versa) motion during combination key entry as a "spin", which is primarily related to the comfortable wrist rotation ability (or desire) of humans. Such spin-ing is repeated multiple times during any combination key entry, approximately every half a turn (π) and over a mean duration of approximately 5 seconds. We can observe this phenomenon in the sample gyroscope (x-axis) time-series corresponding to a padlock unlocking operation ( Figure 3 ). We utilize the above observations in the design of the following four features that will be employed by our unlocking activity recognition technique: In order to confirm the above observations, we compute the means and standard deviations of the above four features over all the 5 second windows (average duration of a spin) in the preliminary unlocking-related gyroscope data collected earlier (Figure 2a, 2b, 2c ). We observe that the mean values of the magnitudes of + α andα are approximately similar in a spin, the mean value of the total displacement magnitude is approximately double of both + α andα, and the mean value of the summed displacement is close to zero. We employ these learned mean and standard deviation values to form a decision-tree for detecting spins. During the activity recognition, the above four features are recursively computed for every 5 second window, and the decisiontree classifies a window as a spin if all the four features are within one standard deviation of the learned means. In the case of padlock, if 5 (minimum number of spins observed for the shortest padlock combination: 39-0-39) or more spins are observed within a certain time window, empirically determined based on the maximum unlocking time observed in data, an unlocking activity is recognized. A similar strategy could be used to recognize unlocking operation on a safe.
Segmentation
Segmentation of the gyroscope data time-series representing the entire combination key input into data corresponding to individual phases or transitions (three for the padlock and four for the safe) will simplify the overall design of the inference framework. This is because the combination inference problem can then be reduced to the problem of independently inferring the combination number corresponding to each segmented transition. In order to design a reliable segmentation technique, we leverage on the observation from our earlier experiments that humans tend to slow down when they approach a number in their combination key, and this observation was consistent across all subjects. We believe that this phenomenon is due to the cognitive processing of the human brain governing the physiological action of stopping at a particular number, which causes the subjects to slow down when approaching the intended number in their combination key or risk overshooting it (and thus having to restart the entire key entry process). We can observe this phenomenon in the time-series gyroscope data corresponding to the unlocking operation of the Master Lock 1500T padlock by one of the subjects, where we can clearly see ( Figure 3 ) the sharp decreases in the angular velocity (red line) when approaching the combination key number near the end of each phase. In order to automate the process of segmentation, we design an algorithm to detect the relative decrease in angular velocity, and use the peaks (representing slowest movement) to segment the entire time-series. The algorithm first computes the absolute values of all samples in the gyroscope timeseries data, inverts, and then amplifies the time-series by a factor of 10 (for better visualization). Then, on the resultant time-series, a Gaussian filter with a moving window [16] of 15 samples (learned empirically, at 200 Hz sampling frequency) is applied. Finally, the algorithm performs a search for top-2 global peaks in the resultant time-series, which represents approximate timestamps for the first and second number of the combination key, in chronological order. The blue line in Figure 3 is an example of the visualized output of our segmentation algorithm, showing the detected peaks and resulting segmentation timestamps. The proposed segmentation algorithm is general enough and works for gyroscope data from both the padlock and safe.
Deterministic Attack Framework
We develop two learning-based attack or inference frameworks to infer numbers of the combination key inputted on the lock's dial from the segmented smartwatch gyroscope data. In this section, we present a deterministic framework which outputs a single inferred combination key from the segmented time-series gyroscope input. We first outline the deterministic inference framework for the padlock, and later extend it to the safe.
Padlock Attack Model
Assuming that the starting point s on the padlock's dial is fixed (say, to 0), we can define Φ 1 = {81, 82.., 120}, Φ 2 = {41, 42.., 80} and Φ 3 = {1, 2.., 40} as the sets of possible padlock transitions in phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3 of the unlocking procedure, respectively. Now for a given 3-number combination key k =< a, b, c > of the The adversary can employ a least squares [51] technique in order to learn such a linear function (Figure 2d ). Then during the attack phase, for an unknown combination keŷ k =<â,b,ĉ >, the adversary first segments the gyroscope data and computes the corresponding angular displacements α sâ k , αâb k and αbĉ k . The adversary's goal then is to determine a combination k , as an inference ofk, by first approximating or estimating the θ sâ k ∈ Φ 1 , θâb k ∈ Φ 2 and θbĉ k ∈ Φ 3 values from the corresponding angular displacements (α sâ k , αâb k and αbĉ k , respectively). Let these approximations of θ sâ k , θâb k and θbĉ k be denoted asθ sâ ,θâb andθbĉ, respectively. In order to accomplish this, the adversary employs the linear function (α = mθ + n) learned earlier. Once the angular displacement of the wrist and the corresponding transition for each phase has been estimated, k can be computed as k =< (120 −θ sâ ), (θâb + (120 −θ sâ ) − 40), (40 −θbĉ + (θâb + (120 −θ sâ ) − 40)) >.
Safe Attack Model
The above deterministic model for the padlock can be generalized for the 4-number combination keys of the safe as follows. Similar to the padlock, we can define Then during the attack phase, for an unknown combination keyk =<â,b,ĉ,d >, the adversary first segments the timeseries gyroscope data and computes the corresponding angular displacements α sâ k , αâb k , αbĉ k and αĉd k . The adversary's goal then is to determine a combination k as an inference ofk by first approximating or estimating the θ sâ k ∈ Ψ 1 , θâb k ∈ Ψ 2 , θbĉ k ∈ Ψ 3 and θĉd k ∈ Ψ 4 values from the corresponding angular displacements (α sâ k , αâb k , αbĉ k and αĉd k , respectively). Let these approximations of θ sâ k , θâb k , θbĉ k and θĉd k be denoted asθ sâ ,θâb,θbĉ andθĉd, respectively. In order to accomplish this, the adversary employs the linear function (α = pθ + q) learned earlier. Then the adversary computes k as k =< (θ sâ mod 100), ((300 + (θ sâ mod 100) − θâb) mod 100), ((θbĉ + ((300 + (θ sâ mod 100) −θâb) mod 100)) mod 100), ((100 −θĉd + ((θbĉ + ((300 + (θ sâ mod 100) −θâb) mod 100)) mod 100)) mod 100) >.
Probabilistic Attack Framework
One shortcoming of the deterministic models is that they output only a single prediction, which if incorrect, is not very useful to the adversary. There is no way to obtain combinations "close" to the inferred combination key in these models; such a (preferably, ranked) list of "close" combinations is useful in reducing the search space, especially if the predicted combination is incorrect. A preliminary empirical analysis of our deterministic models show that the inference error (for each inferred number in the combination) has a low standard deviation, which suggests that numbers neighboring an incorrect inference have a higher likelihood of being part of the real combination key than numbers farther away. We use this observation in the design of our probabilistic framework.
Ranking of Padlock Key Predictions
The goal of the probabilistic framework is to create an ordered list of inferred combinations, ranked based on the probability of a combination being the actual combination. We achieve this objective by giving priority to transitions closer toθ sâ ,θâb andθbĉ (calculated by the deterministic model), than transitions further away from it. This is done by assigning probabilities to all possible transitions in Φ 1 , Φ 2 and Φ 3 using three normal distributions N (θ sâ , σ 2 sâ ), N (θâb, σ 2 ab ) and N (θbĉ, σ 2 bĉ ), respectively. The means and standard deviations of these distributions are learned from the deterministic model presented in Section 5.1. Specifically, we calculate probabilities P (X|α sâ k ) for all possible transitions X ∈ Φ 1 being the actual transition performed in phase 1, P (Y |αâb k ) for all possible transitions Y ∈ Φ 2 being the actual transition performed in phase 2, and P (Z|αbĉ k ) for all possible transitions Z ∈ Φ 3 being the actual transition performed in phase 3, as outlined in Equation 1 .
Once P (X|α sâ k ), P (Y |αâb k ) and P (Z|αbĉ k ) for all possible transitions X, Y and Z are computed, the probability P (k = k ) of each of the 64K possible combination keys k being the actual combinationk entered by the target user can be determined as:
Where k can be obtained from the corresponding X,Y and Z as k =< (120−X), (Y +(120−X)−40), (40−Z +(Y + (120−X)−40)) >. All the 64K combinations k can then be ordered or ranked using P (k = k ), with a higher value of P (k = k ) indicating that k is more likely to be the actual combinationk. Such an ranked list of combinations, denoted asK, provides the adversary with a targeted search space to carry out the inference attack. If the actual combination keŷ k lies in the top-r ofK, then the attack framework is said to succeed after r attempts in the worst-case. The adversary would obviously like r to be as small as possible.
Ranking of Safe Key Predictions
The above probabilistic model for the padlock can be trivially extended to the safe. This is done by calculating probabilities P (W |α sâ k ); ∀W ∈ Ψ 1 , P (X|αâb k ); ∀X ∈ Ψ 2 , P (Y |αbĉ k ); ∀Y ∈ Ψ 3 and P (Z|αĉd k ); ∀Z ∈ Ψ 4 using normal distributions N (θ sâ , σ 2 sâ ), N (θâb, σ 2 ab ), N (θbĉ, σ 2 bĉ ) and N (θĉd, σ 2 cd ), respectively. Then, the probability P (k = k ) of each of the 100 4 possible combination keys k being the actual combinationk entered by the target user can be determined as:
Where k can be obtained from the corresponding W , X, Y and Z as k =< (W mod 100), ((300 + (W mod 100)−X) mod 100), ((Y +((300+(W mod 100)− X) mod 100)) mod 100), ((100 − Z + ((Y + ((300 + (W mod 100)−X) mod 100)) mod 100)) mod 100) >. All the 100 4 combinations k can then be ranked using P (k = k ), with a higher value of P (k = k ) indicating that k is more likely to be the actual combinationk.
Search Space Reduction
Although the theoretical combination space for both the Master Lock 1500T and the First Alert 2087F-BD are large enough to make manual brute-force attacks impractical, the padlock has some well-known design limitations. In practice, only a set of 4000 keys are used in the production design of Master Lock, as pointed out in a LifeHacker article [1] . Accordingly, after studying how our probabilistic attack model performs on the entire 40 3 key space, we also analyze how our attack can improve predictions within the already reduced space of 4K combinations. We are not aware of similar limitations in the First Alert safe.
Evaluation
We conduct comprehensive empirical evaluations of the proposed deterministic and probabilistic attack frameworks in order to assess their performance under realistic lock operation scenarios. Our evaluation results are outlined next.
Experimental Setup
We evaluate the proposed attack frameworks by means of smartwatch gyroscope data collected from a set of human subject participants who performed unlocking operations on the Master Lock 1500T padlock and the First Alert 2087F-BD safe with the watch-wearing hand. For our experiments, we employed a Samsung Gear Live smartwatch which runs Android Wear 1.5 mobile OS and is equipped with a In-venSense MP92M 9-axis Gyro + Accelerometer + Compass sensor. The smartwatch's gyroscope sensor was sampled at 200 Hz, and the samples were transmitted over a Bluetooth connection to a paired Android smartphone (specifically, a Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4). The smartphone recorded the received sensor data stream in to labeled files, which were later used for training and validation (testing). All preprocessing, training and testing were performed on a server equipped with dual Intel Xeon L5640 processors and 64 GB of RAM. During the data collection, participants are clearly explained the unlocking procedure for each lock. The locks are placed on a flat table and the participants sit on a chair across the table while unlocking. For the first part of our evaluation (sections 7.2 and 7.3), we collect and use data from the participants' right hand (i.e., the right hand was used to unlock) in a controlled setting. In this setting, each combination is dictated one at a time to the participants who would then correctly enter it on the lock using the previously explained unlocking procedures. The exact number and order of combinations entered by the participants varies for both the padlock and the safe, and will be outlined in detail later.
We would like to highlight that our only objective for collecting unlocking-related motion data from human subject participants was to employ it for a realistic evaluation of the proposed inference frameworks. Our data collection procedure posed no safety or ethical risks to participants and no private or personally identifiable information (including, combinations of personal locks/safes) was collected from participants. It was also approved by our institution's IRB.
Deterministic Attack Framework Results
We evaluate the performance of the deterministic attack model by measuring the standard deviations of the inferred transitionsθ ij from the corresponding ground-truths θ ij for each phase of the unlocking operation. Within this model, we evaluate three different inference methods: i) inferring transitions ( +θij ) solely using positive displacements ( + α ij ), ii) inferring transitions ( -θij ) solely using negative displacements (α ij ), and iii) averaging inferences ( +θij + -θij 2 ) obtained individually using positive and negative displacements. Our objective is to determine if transition inference using any one displacement parameter is better than the other.
Results for Padlock. The training dataset for the
Master Lock 1500T padlock is composed of data collected from 3 participants (who are the authors). Each participant entered 40 different 3-digit combinations, covering all of the 120 possible transitions (40 in each of Φ 1 , Φ 2 and Φ 3 ). This data entry was repeated 3 times by each participant, resulting in a total of 9 complete datasets which is used for training the deterministic attack model. It should be noted that while entering each combination the participants always started from the number '0' and entered the combination by correctly following the unlocking procedure described in Section 4.1. The testing dataset was collected from a different set of 5 participants (non-authors). Each of these test participants entered 8 different 3-digit combinations , and repeated the data entry 3 times. The combination of data collected from all the 5 participants resulted in 3 complete test datasets covering all the 120 possible transitions. The data collection task is a non-trivial and time-consuming process due to the high cognitive workload associated with entering new and previously unknown combinations which resulted in a significant number of input errors by the participants. All input errors during data-collection were closely monitored and eliminated from the final datasets, and participants were asked to re-enter combinations on which errors occurred. We took utmost care to ensure that our test dataset is complete (covering all transitions) and reasonably heterogeneous (from 5 different participants) to avoid any bias in the evaluation results. The evaluation results, outlined next, are using the averaged prediction over all the 3 test datasets. Table 1 shows the linear least-squares fittings for α sa , α ab and α bc , learned from the 9 training sets. These learned linear least-squares fitting parameters (m and n) are then used within the deterministic framework to infer the 120 unique transitions in the test dataset. Table 2 shows the standard deviations in inference errors for the inferred transitions in phase 1 (θ sa ), in phase 2 (θ ab ) and in phase 3 (θ bc ). From this table we can see that the inference averaging method (i.e., third column) resulted in lowest error for the inference of transitions in phase 1 (specifically, 12.27 units) and phase 2 (specifically, 8.49 units), respectively. However, inference , we observed a larger number of participant errors during combination entry. As before, all input errors were closely monitored and removed from the final datasets, and participants re-entered combinations for which an entry error was observed. Due to a large combination space, in addition to the more complex unlocking procedure, we restricted ourselves to only partial test datasets for the safe. However, we made sure that the test dataset is uniform in terms of the distribution of the various transitions and the participants that recorded those transitions to avoid any bias in the evaluation results. The evaluation results, outlined next, are using the averaged prediction over all the 3 test datasets. Table 3 shows the linear least-squares fittings for α sa , α ab , α bc and α cd , learned from the 3 training sets. These learned linear least-squares fitting parameters (p and q) are then used to infer the 80 unique transitions in the test datasets. The standard deviations in inference errors for the inferred transitions in phase 1 (θ sa ), in phase 2 (θ ab ), in phase 3 (θ bc ) and in phase 4 (θ cd ) are outlined in Table  4 . From this table we can see that the inference averaging method resulted in the lowest error for the inference of tran- sitions in phase 1 (specifically, 22.99 units), while inference using positive displacement ( + α ab ) resulted in the lowest error for the inference of transitions in phase 2 (specifically, 17.87 units). For transitions in phase 3 and phase 4, inference using the corresponding negative displacements (i.e., α bc andα cd ) resulted in lowest errors (specifically, 8.67 and 7.24 units, respectively). Similar to the padlock case, we can observe that inference of shorter transitions in safe combinations are more accurate. Moreover, we also observe that the standard deviations of inference errors for the safe are relatively higher compared to the padlock. We believe that this is due to the higher concentration of numbers on the safe's lock dial, compared to the padlock's dial, for the same angular displacement.
Probabilistic Attack Framework Results
We evaluate the performance of the probabilistic attack model by first computing the overall success probability of transitions in the test data being present in the top-r of their corresponding ranked inferred transition set, for different values of r. Similar to the deterministic model, we compare inference accomplished solely using positive displacements ( + α ij ), solely using negative displacements (α ij ), and an average of inferences obtained individually using positive and negative displacements. In addition to the transitions, we also evaluate the overall success probability of test combination keys being present in the top-r of their corresponding ranked inferred combination sets.
Padlock Key Predictions.
We first evaluate the performance of the probabilistic model in inferring padlock transitions during each unlocking phase. We accomplish this by computing the overall success probability of test transitions in each phase being present in the top-r of their corresponding inferred transition set that is ranked (and ordered) using probabilities computed from the normal distributions outlined in Equation 1. The success probabilities for each phase (depicted in Figures 4d, 4e and 4f) are estimated by measuring the ratio of test transitions in that phase that are present in the top-r of their corresponding probabilistically ranked inferred transition set. The value of r is varied from 5 to 40 in steps of 5. The same test and training datasets from the evaluation of the deterministic model (section 7.2.1) are used for this analysis. Similar to the results of the deterministic model, we observe from Figures 4d, 4e and 4f that inferring shorter transitions (e.g., transitions in phase 3 or Φ 3 ) is generally more accurate or successful than longer transitions (e.g., transitions in phase 1 or Φ 1 ). One interesting observation we make is that the overall success probability of a test transition in each phase being present in the top-r of their corresponding ranked inferred transition set output by the probabilistic model is always greater (sometimes, significantly) than the success probability after r random guesses (which is, r 40 for a total of 40 transitions in each phase). For example, we observe an overall success probability of 57.5% for correctly inferring phase 3 transitions in 5 or less attempts (by using negative displacements for inference), whereas the probability of success in 5 random guesses is only 12.5%. We next evaluate the success probability of finding an entire test combination key within the top-r of the corresponding set of candidate keys ranked using the probabilistic model. For this analysis, we include all 64K possible padlock combinations k =< a, b, c > (i.e., all 64K possible combinations of θ sâ ∈ Φ 1 , θâb ∈ Φ 2 and θbĉ ∈ Φ 3 ), as test combinations. In this case, rather than using all the three methods for the inference of the individual transitions of the test combination, i.e., inference using only positive displacements, only negative displacements, and averaging individual inferences, we optimize the overall combination inference by first calculating the mean reciprocal rank (MRR) [15] of these three methods for each phase by using the previous transition inference results. Then, the inference method with the highest MRR in each phase is used for inferring transitions of the test combination key in that phase. In case of the padlock, we observed that transition inference using negative displacement had the highest MRR in each of the three phases (MRRs of 0.05, 0.075 and 0.075, respectively). Thus for all the 64K test padlock combinations, transitions in all the three phases were inferred using only the corresponding negative displacements. The value of r was increased from 50 to 64,000 in varying steps. Figure 5a shows the success probability of finding a test combination within the top-r of the corresponding probabilistically ranked (using Equation 2) set of candidate keys. For r = 50, 688 test combinations (out of a total of 64K test combinations) were found in the top-50 of their corresponding ranked inferred combination set, which equates to a 1.075% overall probability of success. Compared to this, the probability of correctly picking a test combination after 50 random guesses is only 0.078%. This implies that for r = 50 the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement by a factor of 13.76 over random guessing. Figure 5d show similar improvements factors for all other top-r cases. These results indicate that an adversary can significantly reduce the search space, and still have high probability of success. We again evaluate the success probability of finding an entire test combination key within the top-r of the corresponding set of candidate keys ranked using the probabilistic model, but this time using the only the 4K implemented padlock combinations (outlined in Section 6.3) as test combinations. Similar to the 64K analysis, to optimize the overall combination inference, the inference method with the highest MRR in each phase is used for inferring transitions of the test combination key in that phase. In other words, for all the 4K implemented test padlock combinations, transitions in all the three phases were inferred using only the corresponding negative displacements. The value of r was increased from 10 to 4,000 in varying steps. Figure 5b shows the success probability of finding a test combination within the top-r of the corresponding probabilistically ranked (using Equation 2) set of candidate keys. For r = 10, 235 test combinations (out of a total of 4K test combinations) were found in the top-10 of their corresponding ranked inferred combination set, which equates to a 5.875% overall probability of success. Compared to this, the probability of correctly picking a test combination (among all the implemented keys) after 10 random guesses is only 0.25%. This implies that for r = 10 the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement by a factor of 23.5 over random guessing. Figure 5e show similar improvements factors for all other top-r cases. These results indicate that an adversary can significantly reduce the search space leveraging on both mechanical flaws and eavesdropped wrist-movements.
Safe Key Predictions.
Similar to the padlock case, we first evaluate the performance of the probabilistic model in inferring safe transitions during each unlocking phase. We accomplish this by computing the overall success probability of test transitions in each phase being present in the top-r of their corresponding inferred transition set that is ranked (and ordered) using probabilities computed from the normal distributions as outlined in section 6.2. The success probabilities for each phase is measured as described before and the value of r was varied from 10 to 100 (i.e. all possible transitions within each phase) in steps of 10. The same test and training data sets from the evaluation of our deterministic model (Section 7.2.2) are used for this analysis. Figures 6a,  6b, 6c and 6d shows the success probabilities of transition inference for phase 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, estimated by measuring the ratio of test transitions in that phase that are present in the top-r of their corresponding probabilistically ranked inferred transition set. As for the padlock case, we first observe that inferring shorter transitions (e.g., transitions in phase 3 and 4) is generally more accurate or successful than longer transitions (e.g., transitions in phase 1 or 2). Moreover as before, the overall success probability of a test transition in each phase being present in the top-r of their corresponding ranked inferred transition set output by the probabilistic model is significantly greater, specifically, for phases 3 (Figure 6c ) and 4 (Figure 6d) , than the success probability after r random guesses (which is, r 100 for a total of 100 transitions in each phase). We also observe that transition inference using negative displacements performed poorly compared to inference using positive displacements for phase 2, whereas for phase 1 transition inference using both positive and negative displacements performed poorly compared to the averaging or mean method. We next evaluate the success probability of finding an entire test combination key within the top-r of the corresponding set of candidate keys ranked using the probabilistic model. For this analysis, we test 160K safe combinations k =< a, b, c, d > distributed evenly across the entire Similar to padlock key predictions, we optimize the overall combination inference by first calculating the MRR of the three methods (inference using only positive displacements, only negative displacements, and averaging individual inferences) for each four phases by using the previous transition inference results. Then, the inference method with the highest MRR in each phase is used for inferring transitions of the test combination key in that phase. In case of the safe, we observed that transition inference using the averaging method had the highest MRR in phase 1, inference using positive displacements had the highest MRR in phase 2, and inference using negative displacements had the highest MRR in phases 3 and 4. Thus for all the 160K test padlock combinations, transitions in phase 1 were inferred only using the averaging method, transitions in phase 2 were inferred only using positive displacements and transitions in phases 3 and 4 were inferred only using negative displacements. The value of r was increased from 100 to 160,000 in varying steps. It should be noted that in the case of the safe, we only probabilistically rank the (evenly distributed) 160K keys appearing in the test set rather than the entire safe combination space of 100 4 . This is primarily due to the computational challenge associated with computing probabilities for, and then ranking, 100 million combination keys for each of the 160K test combinations, which is an extremely time-consuming process. The adversary, however, does not have a similar problem as he has to rank the entire combination space of 100 4 for only a few test keys, which is relatively easier to compute. Figure 5c shows the success probability of finding a test combination within the top-r of the corresponding probabilistically ranked set of candidate keys. For r = 100, 1142 test combinations (out of a total of 160K test combinations) were found in the top-100 of their corresponding ranked inferred combination set, which equates to a 0.713% overall probability of success. Compared to this, the probability of correctly picking a test combination after 100 random guesses is only 0.062%. This implies that for r = 100 the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement by a factor of 11.42 over random guessing. A straightforward extrapolation of r (multiplying it with a factor of 5 4 ) puts the value of r at 62500 for achieving similar improvement if the entire combination space of 100 4 combinations is ranked. Readers should note that labels marked in red in Figure 5c are extrapolated values of r. Figure 5f show similar improvements factors for all other top-r cases. These results indicate that an adversary can significantly reduce the search space, and still have high probability of success.
Cross-Device Performance
So far we have evaluated our inference models in a same-device setting where the same smartwatch hardware (Samsung Gear Live smartwatch with an InvenSense MP92M sensor) was used for collecting both the training and testing datasets. However in a practical setting, an adversary may be unaware of, or may not possess, the precise wrist-wearable hardware used by the target user. Thus, it is extremely important to assess the performance of the proposed inference frameworks when different wristwearable hardwares are used for training and testing (attack) purposes. In other words, a comparison of the earlier evaluation results with results using test data from a different smartwatch would tell us if the proposed attack is interoperable across different devices. For brevity, we analyze the cross-device performance of the proposed inference frameworks only for attacking the First Alert 2087F-BD safe. For this, we collect the same set of test data for the safe as detailed in Section 7.2.2 by using a LG Watch Urbane smartwatch equipped with an on-board InvenSense M651 6-axis Gyro + Accelerometer sensor (sampled at 200 Hz) and running Android 2.0 mobile OS. We then employ the linear function α = pθ + q (Table 3) , trained from the data collected with a Samsung Gear Live (as outlined in section 7.2.2) using a linear least-squares fittings technique, to infer transitions in the test data from the corresponding angular displacements. A comparison of the standard deviations in inference error (Table 5) does not show significant change in prediction results we observed earlier (Table 4 ). A pairwise two-tailed t-test [53] of all the values in both tables resulted in t = 0.11; p = 0.915. The small value of t (with a high p value) validates that the mean difference between the two sets of results is not significant. These results indicate that the adversary can train the inference models using data from one device and use these trained models to carry out inference attacks on data from a different wrist-wearable device, provided data from this device is sampled at the same frequency. 
Cross-Hand Performance
All evaluations of our inference models so far have been accomplished using training and testing datasets collected from subjects who only used their right hand for the unlocking operation. However in a practical setting, a target user may not perform the unlocking operation with the same hand that the adversary has trained its models on. Thus, it is important to assess the performance of the proposed inference frameworks when training and testing data corresponding to the unlocking operation comes from different hands. In other words, we would like to analyze if the proposed inference models trained using unlocking data from one hand (say, right) can be used to infer combinations entered using the other hand (say, left). For this we collect the same test data for the padlock as detailed in Section 7.2.1, but this time the participants (non-authors) wore the Samsung Gear Live smartwatch on their left hand and entered the test combinations on the padlock with their left hand. We then employ the linear function α = mθ + n, trained earlier using the right hand data (Table 1) , to infer transitions in each phase using the deterministic model.
A comparison of the standard deviations in inference error (Table 6 ) does not show significant change in prediction results we observed earlier using same-hand (i.e., right hand) predictions ( Table 2) . A pair-wise two-tailed t-test of all the values in both tables resulted in t = 1.33; p = 0.219. The small value of t (with a p > 0.05) indicates that the mean difference between the two sets of results is not significant. These results indicate that an adversary can indeed focus on training a single model with either hand's data, and use it on both left and right handed targets. 
Real-Life Detection and Prediction
In this part of the experiment, we evaluate the performance of our unlocking activity recognition (Section 4.3), under real-life settings. To facilitate a real-life experiment with three participants, we handed out a Samsung Gear Live smartwatch, a paired smartphone and a padlock, for them to take home. The watch was installed with our recording application and the unlock activity recognition algorithm. We collected x-axis gyroscope data for the duration of approximately 1 day, during which the participants were instructed to perform at least three padlock unlock operations with a 3-digit combination of their choice (among the 4K implemented keys for the padlock), at random intervals. Overall, our unlock activity recognition algorithm yielded 100% recall and 76.47% precision, with a total of 13 true positives, 4 false positives and 0 false negative. Interestingly, the 4 false positives were reportedly due to activities similar to padlock unlocking, such as when washing hands after rotating a washer tap/faucet, and while using a screw driver. Next, we evaluate the prediction accuracy of the custom key entered by each participant by using the last three instance of their unlocking gyroscope time-series data, as extracted from the entire day's data. Applying the same inference model for ranking keys among the 4K implement keys, used in Section 7.3.1, the real key entered by the three participants were ranked at 2, 46 and 61 (out of 4000). These results demonstrate the extent to which the proposed attacks can reduce the combination search space even in real-life uncontrolled settings.
Discussions

Limitations
Our attacks assume that the user wears his/her wristwearable on the hand used to unlock the padlock or safe. This may not always be the case, causing the attack to fail. While we did not find any statistics in the literature to deduce the percentage of users who use the same hand for both, according to an on-going online poll with about 5000 participants [2] , approximately 38.23% of users prefer to wear watches on their dominant hand. To complicate our analysis further, with the advent to fitness trackers (most of which also have gyroscope sensors), users tend to wear their watches and wrist-based fitness trackers on different hands. However, regardless of the exact statistics, we hope that this work will help create awareness among the potentially affect users.
Protection Mechanisms
Users can take few preventive measures to avoid falling victim to the proposed attacks. A simple measure could be to use the hand without any wrist-wearable for unlocking, or to take off any wrist-wearables before unlocking. Users could also inject noise in the data by shaking their hand in between the unlock operation. More complex protection mechanisms can include dynamic access control of zeropermission sensors such as the gyroscope. As some of the previous works suggested [13] , [29] , a dynamic access control can take advantage of contextual information to automatically cut-off sensor access when users are detected to be vulnerable. A potential solution in this direction could be to use our unlocking activity recognition algorithm (presented in Section 4.3) in a real-time fashion, so as to disable the gyroscope after the first few spins.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two motion-based attack frameworks to infer mechanical lock combinations from smartwatch gyroscope data. A comprehensive evaluation using a commercial padlock and safe, demonstrated that our framework can significantly reduce the combination search space, and still have a high probability of success for the adversary. The key search space can be further reduced in case of the padlock by leveraging on mechanical design flaws. We also observed that the performance of the proposed inference models does not degrade significantly when trained using data obtained from one smartwatch hardware (or one hand) and used to carry out inference attacks on data from a different hardware (or a different hand, respectively). Finally, we also demonstrated the feasibility and efficacy of the proposed inference attack in a real-life setting.
